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AdjudicAtion
 Commonly used war-game adjudication methods break down and create unreliable results when addressing novel operational or strategic problems 
for which we have little experience or data (for example, information warfare or 
a regional nuclear conflict) and when we wish to explore situations rather than 
educate officers about well-understood situations. The primary causes of this 
breakdown are, first, the incorrect assumption that adjudicators are impartial 
controllers instead of dominant players and, second, the design choice to make 
the players’ decisions the game’s primary output. Among the many reasons for 
war gaming (such as research and analysis, training, education, and discovery), 
this article focuses on “discovery” war games, where the objective is to find out 
something previously unknown about a novel operational or strategic problem, 
something that cannot be better discovered by other methods, such as seminars, 
work groups, modeling and simulation, or operations research.
There exists a wide variety of definitions of 
war gaming, leading to different kinds of games, 
including field exercises, technology-enhanced 
“man in the loop” arrangements where players 
interact with and via computer models or simula-
tions, stand-alone computer models or simula-
tions, and closed-form mathematical equations.1 
These categories are either too broad to be useful 
or focus on simulations or mathematical models 
that assume by definition that we understand 
enough about the situations being gamed to model 
them. They preclude the discovery of insights 
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into novel situations by the open-ended exploration of competing interests. in 
contrast, the definition of a war game given by Peter Perla—“a warfare model 
or simulation that does not involve the operations of actual forces, in which the 
flow of events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those 
events by players representing the opposing sides”—can be used to game novel 
operational and strategic situations, focusing on human players and relegating 
technology to labor-saving devices.2 while traditional game design focuses on 
player decisions, there is reason to think there are problems with treating player 
decisions as constituting the game’s primary output and therefore the primary 
input data for analysis. i will argue that because of research indicating that human 
decisions during a game are not reliably indicative of the decisions they would 
make in other circumstances (no matter how similar), other approaches are nec-
essary to extract value from research games.
newtonian physics and the statistics of small-unit actions provide adjudica-
tion rules for determining the possible outcomes of interacting player decisions 
when war-gaming tactical-level attrition warfare. The adjudicators either “roll 
dice” (i.e., use a statistical model of some form) during deductive games to pick 
randomly one of those possible outcomes as the one that actually occurred, or 
during inductive games (described below) decide themselves which one occurred 
so as to force the players into situations that best address the sponsor’s objectives 
for the game. However, for novel operational and strategic problems, we do not 
have the equivalent adjudication rules. in these cases the adjudicators (who usu-
ally are no better informed about the problem domain than the players) have 
first to decide the possible outcomes of interacting player decisions, then decide 
which one occurred, and then decide what information to give to the players.3 
research shows that “people are not aware of the reasons that move them; even 
an introspective person with incentives to estimate how he or she would have 
behaved with different information cannot do this.” 4 This implies that decisions 
made during a war game by players and adjudicators are unreliable predictors of 
decisions that would be made in the external (and future) real-world situation 
the game is attempting to explore. However, research also indicates that human 
beliefs are robust even in the face of contradictory evidence.5 on the basis of 
this research, i will argue that beliefs that surface during a game, indicated by 
the decisions made by the players, should be examined as possibly more reliable 
predictors of what would be believed in the external world than the commonly 
held belief that decisions in a game can be used as predictors of what decisions 
would be made in the external world.
Since adjudicators make decisions not only on the possible outcomes of in-
teracting player decisions but also on which one occurred and on what informa-
tion to give to the players, they are thus in fact not only players but dominant 
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players—diaboli in machina—whose beliefs and consequent actions drive the 
game but whose decisions (like those of the other players) are unreliable pre-
dictors of what decisions would be made in the external real world the game 
is attempting to explore.6 Unless these factors are explicitly handled in design, 
execution, data collection, and analysis, the game will produce results that may 
be seductively compelling but are ultimately unreliable.
This article proposes an approach to discovery war-gaming of novel opera-
tional and strategic problems and offers a partial example from an actual strategic 
deterrence and escalation war game, played in 2009. The approach is twofold: 
first, treat the adjudicators as players whose behavior provides critical informa-
tion for analysis; second, focus design and analysis not on the decisions of the 
game players but on the beliefs of the players and adjudicators and on how those 
beliefs drive decision-making behaviors. decision making by players in the larger 
sense, including adjudicators, is what engages and motivates the participants; 
the value of their decisions is in the insights they provide as to the participants’ 
beliefs, how those beliefs drive behavior, and how the players, adjudicators, and 
analysts interpret and attribute importance to the situations that arise from the 
players’ competing decisions.
Since war gaming is founded on information flows between players and ad-
judicators, there is significant and useful overlap in the psychology of decision 
making used for novel situations when adjudicating the outcomes of inductive-
war-game interactions and that used when assessing live information operations. 
Adjudication and operations assessment both require the operator to make de-
cisions in order to create a desired future (or avoid an undesirable one) and to 
anticipate future outcomes and decisions by others. The arguments in this article 
therefore draw heavily on those made in “Assessing Coin information opera-
tions Aimed at the local Population” and on references contained therein.7
AdjudicAtors Are dominAnt PlAyers
Traditional attrition warfare is relatively simple to game and adjudicate. The 
outcomes of interactions of the decisions of game players are driven by physics 
(for example, external ballistics, logistic flows, time and space factors, etc.) and 
the statistics of millennia of small-unit actions. we know these physics- and 
statistics-based rules, and adjudicators use them to identify the range of what 
could happen as a result of interacting player decisions. Adjudicators consider 
moral effects to be contained within the statistics if the game is a deductive one 
(that is, aimed at specific implications of a general situation) and decide the 
moral factors themselves if the game is inductive (exploring, for instance, the 
operational or strategic ramifications of given specifics). in deductive war games, 
adjudicators essentially roll the dice using established statistics to determine 
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from the identified range of possible outcomes of interacting player decisions the 
specific outcome that will be considered to have occurred in order to place the 
players into a new but valid situation in which to make their next moves. Among 
the roles of adjudicators is that of umpires, ensuring the players do not break the 
laws of physics or statistics. For inductive games, however, instead of rolling the 
dice the adjudicators choose from the range of possible outcomes one that forces 
players to deal with problems related to the objectives of the sponsors. in either 
case, deductive or inductive, the adjudicators also decide what information about 
the outcome to provide each of the player teams.
many of the novel operational and strategic problems in which we are inter-
ested do not have associated bodies of physics, case studies, or statistics on which 
to base adjudication. For example, what are the rules (the equivalent of “phys-
ics” and “statistics”) governing outcomes of information warfare waged during 
a regional nuclear conflict? How many such campaigns have been fought? A 
reasonable answer for most of the problems in which we are interested is zero 
or near zero, and this means that traditional adjudication techniques, based on 
traditional game designs, are inadequate for them. But it is precisely such novel, 
dangerous operational and strategic problems that it is most important to game, 
given the potential costs of not understanding them as well as possible. modern 
novel operational- and strategic-level problems are driven by complex interact-
ing political, military, economic, social, ideological, and infrastructure (PmeSii) 
effects, most of which we do not understand, or at best grasp only intuitively, and 
for which we certainly have no statistically valid sample set of previous situations 
on which to draw.
A common approach is to make available to the adjudicators advisers who 
are subject-matter experts in the appropriate PmeSii areas. These experts draw 
on the established base of political-science theory and modeling to provide the 
best judgments possible about issues relevant to the problem being war-gamed. 
even given the existence of quantitative political-science models, deductive game 
design makes little sense for novel operational and strategic conflict situations; 
there are insufficient past examples and therefore statistics to inform adjudica-
tion. These situations call exclusively for inductive gaming, in which adjudica-
tors draw on subject-matter experts to identify the range of possible outcomes. 
They then decide which of these outcomes did occur, so as to place the players 
into situations relevant to the game’s objectives, and finally what information to 
provide to the players.8
note, however, that to force the players to solve problems of interest to the 
sponsors, the adjudicators have to forecast what those players might do with the 
information they receive. That is, the adjudicators (with their advisers) attempt 
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to forecast likely futures using current information. But the reason we are war-
gaming in the first place is that we do not understand the problem or the rules that 
drive the situation. in a traditional war game it is the players’ job to illuminate the 
problem with insight and understanding, not that of the adjudicators.
Adjudicators and their advisers, then, make subjective professional decisions 
as to the range of what could happen as a result of player decisions, make subjec-
tive professional forecasts about what players might do in the future, and make 
subjective professional decisions about what information to provide the players. 
They do all this from a knowledge base that is as flawed and sparse as that of the 
players in the game cells. At best, the adjudicators may have better subject-matter 
advisers than do the players—which if true raises the question of why the experts 
are not playing the game but instead are advising the adjudicators.9
it is clear that for practical purposes not only are the adjudicators (and their 
subject-matter-expert advisers) actually decision-making players but they in fact 
dominate the war game, given their control over who gets to know what and 
when. in addition, logic offers significant grounds for suspicion as to whether 
their expertise is or even can be adequate to adjudicate games addressing novel 
situations. Adjudicators and their advisers make their decisions on the basis of 
how they believe “the world works”—beliefs that become by definition the rules 
for adjudication. So the adjudicators get to decide the rules of the war game 
dynamically, starting from a position of ignorance, as game play proceeds. All 
this seems to justify a rethinking of how we game novel operational and strategic 
problems. 
PlAyer decisions Are unreliAble
A discovery war game must produce results or insights that are relevant to the 
external, possibly future, world. The game cannot be primarily educational or 
training, since for a novel situation we do not have enough information to teach 
or solutions to train. Therefore we look to the discovery game to provide reliable 
proxies of the external real-world situation. Unfortunately, research indicates that 
game decisions do not provide reliable predictors of the decisions the players or 
others would make if the situation were real.
People Cannot Predict Their Own Decisions—Let Alone Other People’s. Psychol-
ogy and decision-science research into the “adaptive unconscious” theory of mind 
indicates that even reflective people are poor at predicting the decisions they 
would make under different information circumstances.10 decisions are driven 
for most people in great part by the (adaptive) unconscious, which—because 
it is not directly observable by the decision maker—means that decision mak-
ers’ ability to predict or explain how they would make decisions under different 
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circumstances is doubtful at best. Although people tend to recognize cognitive 
biases in others and to take these into account, they also tend to be convinced that 
their own perceptions directly reflect reality and to fail to take into account their 
own biases.11 experimentation shows that this often results in people providing 
incorrect explanations for their decisions while simultaneously being convinced 
those reasons are correct.12 given that the circumstances and information con-
text of some future real world that the game is attempting to explore will inevita-
bly be different from those of the game, it is thus at best unreasonable to assume 
that decisions made in a war game would be reflective of decisions made by the 
same people in some real-world scenario or to take seriously the reasons given 
by the players for their decisions, since we know that people tend to confabulate 
when providing reasons for their decisions. But this is precisely what we ask play-
ers to do—to imagine, knowing they are in a “war game,” with the real present 
all around them, that instead they are in some future (or other) environment and 
to make decisions as though the artificial game world in which they are playing 
is real and to provide reasons justifying their decisions.13 Analysts and sponsors 
then try to draw from the decisions made in the game conclusions about deci-
sions that would be valid in such a future (or other) environment. 
Further, if decisions made in a game are unreliable predictors of decisions made 
in some future world, the situation becomes worse when attempting to use game 
decisions as predictors of other people’s decisions—that is, those made in a real-
world situation by the actual friendly or enemy decision makers whose roles the 
players occupied in the game. war-game “red cells” (playing the opposition) have 
serious problems when they are supposed to represent other cultures. mirror- 
imaging does not matter when we are interested in “Blue” (friendly) decisions 
in the face of red capabilities; in such a case red simply takes the actions most 
dangerous to Blue within the context of game objectives, without regard to real 
cultural proclivities. But mirror-imaging does matter when we are interested in 
Blue decisions in the face of red intentions or in red decision-making behaviors. 
obtaining experts in red thinking brings several problems. expatriates from 
countries of interest often have political agendas, are not necessarily expert in 
their own countries’ political and military decision-making styles (how many 
disgruntled Americans are truly expert on the political and military cultures of 
the United States?), and face security-clearance issues. U.S. citizens who both 
are genuinely expert in foreign cultures and can obtain clearances are rare; we 
can only assume—not know—that their interpretations of foreign cultures are 
accurate.
Unskilled People Are Unaware of It, and Skilled People Are Overconfident. Ad-
judicators and their expert advisers are by definition, as we have seen, unskilled 
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at war-gaming novel operational and strategic problems, precisely because they 
are novel, with no statistics and case studies are few and analogical. Two effects 
demonstrated by psychology research combine to make this a serious problem 
for adjudication. First, people in the lowest quartile of actual competence tend to 
self-assess themselves as in the second-to-highest quartile; their incompetence 
is so great it robs them of the ability to realize they are incompetent. People in 
the highest quartile of actual competence tend to self-assess themselves within 
the highest quartile but slightly lower than is actually the case; they inflate their 
colleagues’ competence compared to their own.14 Second, research shows that 
older and more experienced people tend to be vastly overconfident about their 
ability to control events that involve chance.15 Their successes in past situations, 
many of which involved elements of chance, lead them to underestimate the role 
of luck and to overestimate their ability to handle contingent situations.16 This is 
especially true in competitive situations, where competence at bluffing can mask 
actual incompetence.17 So war games addressing novel concepts get flooded with 
players, adjudicators, and subject-matter advisers who are not expert but confi-
dently believe they are.
Overconfident People Believe They Already Know the Answer. in nearly all cases 
of scientific fraud, three risk factors have been identified as present: the perpe-
trators “knew, or thought they knew, what the answer to the problem they were 
considering would turn out to be if they went to all the trouble of doing the work 
properly; were under career pressure; and were working in a field where individ-
ual experiments are not expected to be precisely reproducible.”18 in war games, 
the first factor is likely present for senior, more experienced people—precisely the 
sort of people invited to be adjudicators or expert advisers—given the results of 
the psychology research just presented, that older and more experienced people 
tend to be unaware of their lack of skills in novel situations and to be overcon-
fident. The second factor is often, though not always, present among players; 
the third factor is clearly characteristic of war gaming. The three risk factors for 
(perhaps unintended) intellectual fraud must be considered likely to be present 
when war-gaming novel and important operational and strategic problems using 
senior officers and civilians as players, adjudicators, and experts.
Beliefs Are Robust in the Face of Contradictory Evidence. Amplifying the over-
confidence problem is the effect demonstrated by research that “beliefs can sur-
vive potent logical or empirical challenges. They can survive and even be bolstered 
by evidence that most uncommitted observers would agree logically demands 
some weakening of such beliefs. They can even survive the total destruction of 
their original evidential bases.”19 Asking someone to generate an explanation of 
why something is true often will strengthen belief in that “something” even after 
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contradictory evidence is provided.20 in addition, corrections to erroneous evi-
dence may actually strengthen misperceptions under some circumstances.21 This 
is especially troubling when the war-game designer and analyst consider asking 
players for their explanations of why they and their opponents made decisions. 
The Central intelligence Agency analyst community suggests four reasons for 
the persistence of (even discredited) beliefs; “we tend to perceive what we ex-
pect to perceive; mind sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change; new 
information is assimilated to existing images; and initial exposure to blurred or 
ambiguous stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better 
information becomes available.”22 Therefore i propose that beliefs identified dur-
ing a war game should be used as predictors for how players (including adjudica-
tors) would interpret information in the real world, and i suggest that it is these 
(and not the decisions themselves) that give us insight into what behaviors might 
occur in the real world.
Player Decisions Generate Situations of Interest in Discovery Games. An argu-
ment for the importance of situations generated by interacting decisions can be 
made. what if a series of player decisions creates a novel situation that can be 
examined to identify incentives for action?23 Although players’ decisions are un-
reliable predictors of future decisions in the real world and are thus not intrinsi-
cally of interest, since they cannot be used to predict real decisions, the situa-
tions that interacting player decisions generate can be of interest in a discovery 
game at the operational and strategic levels.24 Consider the Japanese pre-midway 
war games.25 during these games the contingency of a U.S. carrier task force ap-
pearing on the flank of Admiral Chuichi nagumo’s force was discounted.26 The 
war-game decision to posit a flanking force could not be used by the imperial 
Japanese navy (iJn) staff to predict that the United States would indeed carry 
out such an action. it was the contingency itself that was important, but it was the 
beliefs and cognitive biases of iJn leadership that dictated that this contingency 
was not to be considered interesting.27 The fact that the U.S. carrier task force did 
indeed turn up on the flank was independent of the iJn war-game decision. The 
beliefs and biases that led to the contingency’s being ignored should have been 
identified and challenged by the war-game designers and analysts, but they were 
not, due to the seniority of the officers holding those beliefs and suffering those 
biases. As research indicates, beliefs are robust even in the face of contradictory 
evidence, and the failure or inability to take this factor into account when dealing 
with senior officers during war games can have unfortunate consequences.
WhAt is to be done?
There exists a requirement to war-game novel operational and strategic prob-
lems for exploratory and discovery purposes. However, using traditional game 
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design for this purpose generates two significant risks. First, adjudicators will 
be overconfident and underqualified and their behaviors, though critical to 
the game’s outcome, will be neither collected nor analyzed, and second, there 
will be an overreliance on game decisions made by players and adjudicators 
in drawing conclusions about the real world under investigation, despite the 
evidence that such decisions are not good predictors of decisions made in 
the real world. Such a game is likely to produce unreliable, even deceptive 
conclusions.
These diaboli in machina must be exorcised. i propose that novel operational 
and strategic problems be gamed following two principles. First, explicitly treat 
the control cell and its adjudicators as players, whose behavior and demograph-
ics are to be collected and analyzed in the same way as those of other players. 
Second, shape the war game as a “signaling game,” in comparing messages sent 
by players (including adjudication and Control), either explicitly as communi-
cations or implicitly in their actions, with how those messages were interpreted 
by the receiving players.28 Since beliefs drive interpretation of information, the 
design should include collection of what players believe about themselves and 
about other players. From a player perspective, decisions serve to engage and 
motivate the players, but from the war-game sponsor and designer perspective 
they exist to force the players to confront and interpret (or misinterpret) in-
formation through the lens of their beliefs and to send messages back by their 
decisions or explicit communications. The substantive thread of interacting 
decisions made by player cells and Control generates one possible story from a 
huge range of possible outcomes; they are not, in and of themselves, important. 
However, the contingencies that arise, including decisions not taken, can be 
important—especially those contingencies of decisions dismissed by adjudica-
tors in their role of dominant players. The players’ explanations for dismissing 
a decision or a contingency cannot be taken seriously in a discovery game; it 
is the underlying beliefs and biases driving the decisions that are important, as 
well as the contingency itself.
Analysis of messaging—interpretation, misinterpretation, and intentions—
will provide reasonable indications of beliefs and therefore predictors of how 
information might be interpreted or misinterpreted in the real world, which in 
turn drives decision making. war-game design should focus not on what deci-
sions were made but on why they were made and not made, what messages the 
players intended to send by their decisions and what messages were received, 
what behaviors they wanted to elicit from the other players by their decisions and 
what behaviors they instead obtained.
The design must require that as information flows into a game cell via the 
control cell (as the result of adjudication decisions) players answer the following 
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questions (in addition to taking other, traditional player actions) about each of 
the other teams playing (including the control cell and adjudicators):29
•	 what are the other cells attempting to achieve, make us do, or make us 
believe?
•	 what message are the other cells sending us?
•	 what do the other cells believe about us?
•	 what do we believe about the other cells?
•	 what do we believe about ourselves?
when the control cell answers these questions it is in effect conducting real-
time game analysis. Also, as the players (including Control and adjudicators) 
generate their respective decisions as a result of changes generated by other play-
ers and Control they must be required to answer the questions:
•	 what effect are we trying to achieve (physical effects on the other players, 
reactions taken by the other players, changes to their beliefs)?
•	 what is the message we intend to send to whom by our actions?
•	 what are the risks and unintended possible consequences of each action?
it has been known for players to reject a game’s validity because events in the 
game did not conform to specific prior beliefs. So in addition to the players’ be-
liefs about themselves and the other cells obtained during the game, it is critical 
to elicit from the players at the end of the game their criticisms concerning the 
validity of the game, along with their reasons for these criticisms. Although these 
are obviously useful for design improvement, the main reason for collecting this 
information (assuming the game was properly designed and executed in the first 
place) is to identify players’ beliefs and cognitive biases about what they believe 
should have happened vice what did happen in the game, since these beliefs will 
in part affect future decision making.
Analysis should examine the disconnects between expectations and results, 
between players’ beliefs about themselves and others’ beliefs about themselves, 
and player responses to the differences between these disconnects, under the 
hypotheses that the beliefs driving expectations and responses are robust and 
therefore reasonable predictors of beliefs those players would bring to the real 
world and that people are poor at identifying their own real beliefs.
Psychology and decision-science research plainly indicates that traditional 
war-game design, specifically adjudication, puts results in serious doubt in 
the context of novel operational and strategic problems. The solution is to 
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Every year the Mahan Scholars (an advanced research project group at the 
Naval War College) and U.S. Strategic Command sponsor a strategic deter-
rence and escalation war game. The game, known as DEGRE, is run by the 
War Gaming Department of the College. In 2009 the game design explicitly 
followed the second of the two design principles proposed above; that is, it 
was conducted as a signaling war game (see figure 1) and explicitly analyzed 
beliefs and messaging so as to fulfill the sponsors’ objectives for the game. 
The war-game design did not explicitly analyze the adjudicators and their 
subject-matter-expert advisers as players. However, the design could be easily 
extended to do so; the same “signaling information” could be collected from 
the adjudicators and their advisers as from the traditional player cells (as in 
figure 2). (See “NWC Conducts Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review 
2010,” Naval War College, April 2010, www.usnwc.edu/.)
FiGuRE 1
EXAMPLE MESSAGE And BELiEF GAME dESiGn BEtWEEn tWo PLAYERS
blue cell red cell
War-Game Actions
desired reactions by red  
Blue actions
compare red actions  
desired reactions by Blue
Blue assessments of risks and unintended 
consequences of Blue actions
compare red assessments of risks and unintended  
consequences of red actions
Analysis of Possible drivers of Actions
messages sent by Blue (communications 
and actions)
compare messages received by red (interpretation of 
communications and intentions behind 
actions)
messages received by Blue (interpretation 
of communications and intentions behind 
actions)
compare messages sent by red (communications 
and actions)
Blue beliefs about self compare red beliefs about Blue
Blue beliefs about red compare red beliefs about self
treat adjudicators (or more broadly, the control cell) as dominant players and 
to focus design, data collection, and analysis on interpretation and misinter-
pretation of messages and beliefs instead of on decisions. A partial example of 
this design—a focus on messaging and beliefs—was successfully used by a war 
game in 2009 (see the sidebar). Although it may be onerous, time consuming, 
or difficult to treat adjudicators or the control cell as players and collect infor-
mation from them it is required if the game is to be valid, and hence it must be 
part of design and execution.
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n o t e s 
dr. downes-martin presented an earlier ver-
sion of this article to the Annual Connections 
wargaming Conference, in August 2011, at 
the national defense University, washington, 
d.C. He would like to thank Hank Bright-
man, Jonathan Compton, Peter Perla, robert 
rubel, Paul vebber, Christopher weuve, and 
Yuna wong for helpful comments and discus-
sions during the development of this article. 
See diagram, “Framework for Adjudicating 
discovery war games.”
 1. The Joint Semi-Automated Forces (JSAF) 
system is an example of a distributed simula-
tion where people interact with each other 
and with simulations. JSAF is sponsored by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its program office 
is the navy warfare development Command. 
The “navy Simulation System,” developed by 
Space and naval warfare Systems Command 
and sponsored by Cno (n6) (Support to 
operations), is an example of a stand-alone 
monte Carlo computer simulation system 
used for war gaming. For closed-form 
mathematical equations, see, for example, 
James g. Taylor, Lanchester Models of Warfare 
(Arlington, va.: Ketron for the operations 
research Society of America, 1983), vols. 1, 2.
 2. Peter Perla, “The nature of wargames,” 
chap. 4 in The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for 
Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis, md.: 
naval institute Press, 1990).
 3. The control cell (in which the adjudication 
function resides) is responsible (among other 
tasks) for selecting a preferred outcome dur-
ing inductive games, deciding how to respond 
to game cell player requests for information, 
and deciding what and when information is 
given to players.
 4. robert Jervis, “reports, Politics, and intel-
ligence Failures: The Case of iraq,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 29, no. 1 (February 2006), pp. 
3–52.
 5. lee ross and Craig A. Anderson, “Short-
comings in the Attribution Process: on the 
origins and maintenance of erroneous Social 
Assessments,” in Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, ed. daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 129–52; 
FiGuRE 2
EXAMPLE MESSAGE And BELiEF GAME dESiGn incLudinG contRoL AS A PLAYER
Player cell (any “color”) control cell (adjudication)
War-Game Actions
desired reactions by control cell
Player cell actions
compare Control cell adjudication
desired reactions by player cell
Player cell assessments of risks and unin-
tended consequences of player cell actions
compare Control cell assessments of risks and 
unintended consequences of Control 
adjudications
Analysis of Possible drivers of Actions
messages sent by player cell to Control 
(communications and actions)
compare messages received by control cell (interpre-
tation of communications and intentions 
behind actions)
messages received by player cell (interpre-
tation of communications and intentions 
behind actions)
compare messages sent by control cell (communica-
tions and actions)
Player cell beliefs about self compare Control beliefs about player cell
Player cell beliefs about Control compare Control beliefs about self
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nal of Personality and Social Psychology 32, 
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mark r. lepper, and lee ross, “Perseverance 
of Social Theories: The role of explanation in 
the Persistence of discredited information,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
39, no. 6 (1980), pp. 1037–49.
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not to the simulated real world and are thus 
fundamentally different from the decisions 
of traditional players. However, if the design 
for a discovery game of a novel situation has 
done a good job of recruiting the best subject-
matter experts either to advise or be the 
umpires for that game, one might reasonably 
expect similar experts to be called on in some 
novel real-world situation as advisers. Their 
beliefs and actions during a game are relevant 
to the real world.
 7. See Stephen downes-martin, “Assessing 
Coin information operations Aimed at the 
local Population,” IOSphere, may 2012, pp. 
16–20.
 8. As pointed out by Jon Compton and Yuna 
wong at the 2011 Connections war-gaming 
conference, it is a professional requirement 
for war-game designers to be familiar with 
the political-science theory base and models 
in order to provide adjudicators with the 
range of possible outcomes and provide 
the adjudication cell with advice on which 
outcome to choose to support the sponsor’s 
objectives.
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control cell subject-matter expertise that is 
not present in the player cells. An example 
suggested by robert rubel during discussion 
(24 January 2013) is when one wishes to rep-
resent realistically issues (such as information 
operations, cyberwarfare, or logistics, for ex-
ample) in the game that are not central to the 
problems being investigated. given the core 
objectives of the game and the limited pro-
cedural and intellectual bandwidth available 
to the players due to the time compression of 
most games, expertise in these ancillary issues 
is deliberately restricted to the control cell in 
which the adjudication function is executed. 
The danger now, however, is that since the 
adjudicators are dominant players the game 
is now overly influenced by these ancillary is-
sues that then dominate the core issues being 
explored by the players.
 10. For a summary of the literature on this sub-
ject, see Timothy wilson, Strangers to Our-
selves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious 
(Cambridge, mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 
2002), and robert Jervis, “Understanding 
Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (Fall 2006).
 11. See, for example, emily Pronin, “Perception 
and misperception of Bias in Human Judg-
ment,” elsevier Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
11, no. 1 (January 2007), pp. 37–43.
 12. richard e. nisbett and Timothy d. wilson, 
“Telling more than we Can Know: verbal 
reports on mental Processes,” Psychological 
Review 8 (1977), pp. 231–59.
 13. i claim that however realistic an operational 
or strategic war game, players will be aware it 
is not real and that awareness increases as the 
importance of the situation being explored by 
gaming increases.
 14. Justin Kruger and david dunning, “Un-
skilled and Unaware of it: How difficulties 
in recognizing one’s own incompetence 
lead to inflated Self-assessments,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 77, no. 6. 
(1999), pp. 121–34. 
 15. most people tend to interpret “most people 
tend to” as meaning “everyone else but 
not me.” This is especially true of senior, 
experienced, and successful people, precisely 
because they have been successful in the past.
 16. ellen J. langer, “The illusion of Control,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
32, no. 2 (August 1975), pp. 311–28.
 17. dominic d. P. Johnson, richard w. wrang-
ham, and Stephen Peter rosen, “is military 
incompetence Adaptive? An empirical Test 
with risk-Taking Behaviour in modern 
warfare,” Evolution and Human Behavior 
23 (2002), pp. 245–64. See also eliot Cohen 
and John gooch, Military Misfortunes: The 
Anatomy of Failure in War (new York: Free 
Press, 1990), and malcolm gladwell, “Cock-
sure: Banks, Battles, and the Psychology of 
overconfidence,” New Yorker, 27 July 2009. 
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 18. david goodstein, On Fact and Fraud: Cau-
tionary Tales from the Front Lines of Science 
(Princeton, n.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010). 
(goodstein is vice provost of the California 
institute of Technology.) See also michael 
Shermer, “when Scientists Sin,” Scientific 
American 303, no. 1 (July 2010), p. 34, avail-
able at www.scientificamerican.com/.
 19. ross and Anderson, “Shortcomings in the 
Attribution Process.”
 20. martin F. davies, “Belief Persistence after 
evidential discrediting: The impact of gen-
erated versus Provided explanations on the 
likelihood of discredited outcomes,” Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology 33, no. 6 
(november 1997), pp. 561–78.
 21. Brendan nyhan and Jason reifler, “when 
Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political 
misperceptions,” Political Behavior 32, no. 2 
(June 2010), pp. 303–30.
 22. richards Heuer, Jr., “Perception: why Can’t 
we See what is There to Be Seen?,” chap. 2 in 
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (washing-
ton, d.C.: Center for the Study of intelligence, 
Central intelligence Agency, 1999), available 
at www.cia.gov/. See also Jervis, “Understand-
ing Beliefs.”
 23. Question asked by robert “Barney” rubel, 
dean of the Center for naval warfare Studies 
at the naval war College, 14 december 2012.
 24. one must, however, be careful about what 
defines a discovery game at the operational 
and strategic levels, using the definition 
of discovery used in this article. A tactical 
rehearsal that seeks to discover unpleasant 
downstream effects of a plan does not qualify, 
since the rules both for playing the game and 
for adjudicating the results of tactical kinetics 
are well established and are not subject to 
discovery.
 25. robert rubel suggested this example in the 
cited conversation of 14 december 2012.
 26. mitsuo Fuchida and masatake okumiya, 
Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan 
(Annapolis, md.: naval institute Press, 
1955), p. 97; Jonathan Parshall and Anthony 
Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of 
the Battle of Midway (dulles, va.: Potomac 
Books, 2007), p. 410.
 27. Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, p. 410.
 28. All actions send a message with the intention 
of that message being received and interpret-
ed, and so when war-gaming the operational 
and strategic levels of war, players must 
design their decisions around two types of 
desired effect: the physical effect of an action 
and the cognitive effect in the minds of the 
other players.
 29. Players usually attempt to “game,” or manipu-
late, the control cell; game design should ex-
plicitly capture this behavior and not simply 
assume it away.
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We know the physics and statistics rules that 
govern battlefield dynamics so adjudication uses 
these to decide the range of what could happen 
Adjudication uses subject matter 
expert judgment to decide the 
range of what could happen 
People cannot predict the 
decisions they or others 
would make under different 
information conditions [10] 
Cannot use game decisions as a 
predictor of decisions that players, 
adjudicators or subject matter 
experts would make in real life 
Peoples’ beliefs are robust, 
even under contradictory 
information [19] 
Modern operational or strategic problems 
are driven by complex interacting PMESII 
issues, we do not know these rules for 
complex modern problems 
Unskilled people grossly 
overestimate their own skill 
because they do not know 
how little they know [14] 
Players, adjudicators and 
sponsors often believe they 
already know the answer [18] 
Wargames are not expected 
to be precisely reproducible 
The three risk factors are 
present for fraudulent 
decision making [18] 
The outcomes of interacting 
player decisions are driven 
by physics and statistics 
For deductive games adjudicators “roll the dice” to 
decide what did happen in order to put players 
into a statistically valid situation, they are umpires 
Adjudicators control the game, they 
are the primary players in discovery 
games, not just umpires 
Players make decisions in response 
to information about opponents 
given to them by adjudicators 
People playing or adjudicating 
novel problems are by definition 
unskilled at those problems 
Players, adjudicators and 
sponsors are often under 
career pressure 
Overconfident people blur the 
line between what they can 
control and what they cannot [15] 
Subject Matter Experts and 
Adjudicators tend to be older and 
more experienced people 
We want to wargame 
novel operational and 
strategic problems 
We know how to 
wargame traditional 
attrition warfare 
For inductive games adjudicators decide what 
did happen in order to force players into an 
situation that satisfies the objective of the game 
Adjudicators decide what 
information to provide players 
and give that to them 
Older and more 
experienced people tend 
to be overconfident [15] 
Can use beliefs exhibited during a game 
as a predictor of how players, 
adjudicators and subject matter experts 
would interpret information in real life 
Examine why decisions were made and not 
made, what messages the actions were 
intended to send, and what messages were 
received for both players and adjudicators 
Slightly depressed and negative 
people tend to be better able to think 
skeptically, but are not good leaders 
and often not hired as adjudicators 
Peoples’ statements about their 
beliefs are unreliable and so 
cannot be directly used [5] 
Adjudicating Discovery War Games	  
What do we want? 
Why do we want it? 
Why is this a problem? 
What should we do? 
What helps us get it? 
LEGEND 
We want insights into novel problems 
for which there are insufficient 
statistics or historical case studies for 
other forms of analysis 
Treat the adjudication and white cell as players 
whose behavior and demographics are collected and 
analyzed in the same way as those of other players 
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